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RECENT DECISIONS
case this decision was not followed, but the general rule above ex-
pressed was dearly adopted.'1 Although the subsequent forbearance
agreement fell as usurious, this did not affect the first valid agreement.
It has long been held that an obligation, valid when created, is not
rendered usurious by a latter agreement calling for an illegal rate of
interest, but the latter agreement alone is void.12 Except for the few
inconsistencies above stated '3 the law as expressed in the instant case
is unchallenged.
S.C.
WoRiK]EN's COmPENSATION-DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEY's FEES
IN COMPUTING EmPLoYER'S LIEN OR DEFICIENCY AwARD--SUBRo-
GATION.-Claimant's husband, an employee of the City of New York,
died February 2, 1938 as the result of injuries sustained in the course
of his employment, which were caused by the negligence of a third
person. On March 21, 1938, pursuant to the provisions of Section
29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, claimant served a notice
that an action had been commenced against the third person and that
she made claim for all benefits due her under the Act. On March
22, 1938, an award of compensation was filed with the Department
of Labor giving claimant $10.39 per week, and the City promptly
gave notice that the first payment of compensation had been made.
Thereafter, the action against the third person was settled for $14,000
with the employer's written consent. The widow's share in the re-
covery (after allowing for children) was $3,551.70 after deducting
disbursements and attorney's fees, but was $4,368.37 without deduc-
tion of such fees. The employer claimed it was liable only for the
deficiency between the amount of the recovery and the compensation
provided or estimated, and that attorney's fees should not be deducted
in computing the amount of the recovery "actually collected". Held,
Workmen's Compensation Law § 29, subdivisions 1 and 4, must be
read together, and when so read, provide that where a claimant has
recovered from a third person the employer is liable to pay any defi-
ciency between the compensation provided, or estimated, and the
claimant's recovery less disbursements and attorney's fees. Curtin v.
City of New York, 287 N. Y. 338, 39 N. E. (2d) 903 (1942).
A person whose employment falls within the scope of the Work-
men's Compensation Act may not sue his employer at common law
(1932), affg, 233 App. Div. 766, 250 N. Y. Supp. 189 (2d Dep't 1931); cf.
London v. Toney, 263 N. Y. 439, 446, 189 N. E. 485, 4 (1934), "Interest and
forbearance do relate to a money debt originating otherwise than by a loan."
1 See note 9, supra.
12 Hinman v. Brundage, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 363 (Sup. Ct Del. Co. 1939);
La Monte v. Handy, 250 App. Div. 657, 296 N. Y. Supp. 135 (3d Dep't 1937).
13 See notes 5 and 9, supra.
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for injuries occurring in the course of his employment, provided the
employer has complied with the Act.1 The employee's sole remedy
is to secure an award of compensation.2 This, however, in no way
affects the employee's right to bring a civil action against a third
person whose wrongful conduct caused his injuries.3 If an employee
is injured by a third person while engaged in his employment, he
may take compensation, and at any time, either prior thereto, or with-
in six months after the awarding of compensation, pursue his remedy
against such third person.4 The employer is given a lien upon the
employee's recovery by subdivision 1 of Section 29, "after deduction
of the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's
fees, incurred in effecting such recovery, to the extent of the total
amount of compensation awarded under or provided or estimated by
this chapter for such case." 1 Subdivision 4 of Section 29 deals with
a case wherein the employee recovers from the third party tort feasor
before an award of compensation is made, and provides that in such
case the employer shall contribute only the deficiency, if any, between
the amount of the recovery "actually collected", and the compensation
SiN. Y. WoRx. ComP. LAW § 11; N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAW § 52 (the em-
ployer's failure to comply with the requirements of the Act is a misdemeanor).
2,Ibid.
8 Lester v. Otis Elevator Co., 169 App. Div. 613, 155 N. Y. Supp. 524 (1st
Dep't 1915).
4 N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAW § 29, subd. 1 provides: "If an employee entitled
to compensation under this chapter be injured or killed by the negligence or
wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured employee, or in case of
death, his dependents, need not elect whether to take compensation under this
chapter or to pursue his remedy against such other but may take such compen-
sation and at any time either prior thereto or within six months after the
awarding of compensation, pursue his remedy against such other subject to the
provisions of this section. If such injured employee, or in case of death, his
dependents, take or intend to take compensation 'under this chapter and desire
to bring action against such other, such action must be commenced not later
than six months after the awarding of compensation and in any event before
the expiration of one year from the date such action accrues. In such case, the
state insurance fund, if compensation be payable therefrom, and otherwise the
person, association, corporation or insurance carrier liable for the payment of
such compensation, as the case may be, shall have a lien on the proceeds of any
recovery from such other, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, after
the deduction of the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's
fees, incurred in effecting such recovery, to the extent of the total amount of
compensation awarded under or provided or estimated by this chapter for such
case and the expenses for medical treatment paid by it and to such extent such
recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of such fund, person, association,
corporation or carrier. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be
given within thirty days thereafter to the commissioner, the employer and the
insurance carrier upon a form prescribed by the commissioner." See Hession
v. Sari Corp., 283 N. Y. 262, 28 N. E. (2d) 712 (1940).
5 N. Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 29, subd. 1.
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provided or estimated. 6  Prior to the amendment of 1937,7 which
added subdivision 1 of Section 29, it had been held that the words
"actually collected" did not mean the net recovery after the deduction
of attorney's fees.8 In the instant case, the court has held that the
method of computing the amount the employee actually collects when
proceeding under subdivision 1, is expressive of a legislative intent
to have the same method apply to the computation of the amount
"actually collected" as those words are used in subdivision 4.9 In the
instant case the court held that attorney's fees and disbursements
should be deducted from claimant's recovery before determining the
deficiency which the employer is bound to contribute between such
recovery and the total estimated compensation. It is submitted that
the statute provides that the employer shall contribute "the deficiency"
only in the event that the employee recovers from a third person
before an award of compensation is made.10 Here, the award preceded
the recovery, and therefore the case does not fall under subdivision 4.11
When the making of an award precedes the recovery from a third
6N. Y. WoRK. Coup. LAW § 29, subd. 4 provides: "If such injured em-
ployee, or in case of death, his dependents, proceed against such other, the state
insurance fund, person, association, corporation, or insurance carrier, as the
case may be, shall contribute only the deficiency, if any, between the amount of
the recovery against such other person actually collected, and the compensation
provided or estimated by this chapter for such case."
7 N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 87, § 29. A later amendment, N. Y. Laws 1937,
c. 684, merely numbered the divisions of the section.
8 Matter of Solomone v. Degnon Contracting Co., 194 App. Div. 50, 184
N. Y. Supp. 735 (3d Dep't 1920); Matter of Kabel v. Lane Engineering Co.,
196 App. Div. 669, 187 N. Y. Supp. 833 (3d Dep't 1921); Matter of Mohr v.
Wiebusch & Hilger, Ltd., 247 App. Div. 679, 289 N. Y. Supp. 421 (3d Dep't
1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 655, 5 N. E. (2d) 378 (1936); Matter of Mundt v.
William Spencer & Son Contracting Corp., 250 App. Div. 693, 295 N. Y. Supp.
888 (3d Dep't 1937), mwodified, 276 N. Y. 677, 13 N. E. (2d) 57 (1937).
9 Said the court: "They [subdivisions 1 and 4] must be read together and
each must be given the construction which will effectuate the legislative intent.
So read, there can be no reasonable doubt that the words 'amount of the recov-
ery * * * actually collected' are intended to mean 'actually collected' after the
claimant has paid the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in obtaining
any recovery." 287 N. Y. 338, 343, 39 N. E. (2d) 903, 905.
10 See note 6, supra.
1 In Hobbs v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, Inc., et al., 258 App.
Div. 836, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 694 (3d Dep't 1939), claimant actually recovered
from the third person responsible for his injuries, and thereafter claimed com-
pensation for the deficiency pursuant to subdivision 4 of Section 29 of the Act.
The court held that although subdivision 4 had not been altered by the 1937
amendment to Section 29, the amendment clearly expressed the legislature's
intent that attorney's fees should be deducted in computing the deficiency which
the employer is bound to contribute under subdivision 4.
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person, as in the instant case, subdivision I applies. 12 By reading
subdivision 1 into subdivision 4 the court reached the correct result,
because the facts of the instant case fall squarely under subdivision 1.
Reference to subdivision 4 was unnecessary, and therefore the court's
holding that subdivisions 1 and 4 must be read together is dictum.13
A. J. G.
See note 4, supra. Note that under subdivision 1 the employer's lien
upon the employee's recovery is given not only where the compensation has
been fudly paid, but also for the estimated amount of compensation which the
employer will be bound to pay in future installmeits, where compensation is
awarded in that manner.
1- See Hobbs v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, Inc., et at., 258
App. Div. 836, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 694 (3d Dep't 1939), wherein it was necessary
to determine the effect which the addition of subdivision 1 by the 1937 amend-
ment of the section has had upon subdivision 4. For a more extended discus-
sion of some of the problems which have arisen in connection with Section 29
of the WORKMEN'S COMPExSATION LAW, see (1940) 15 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 283.
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